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Metropolitan labor markets are characterized by gross flows, much larger than the 
traditional net measures of employment change might suggest. Standard impact 
analyses of employment change tend to either ignore these flows or treat them as a 
matter of 'job churning'. But in a metropolitan area experiencing involuntary 
unemployment and underemployment, these flows may offer real opportunities for 
individuals to improve their employment positions. Such improvement occurs along 
'job chains' in which a new vacancy opens a sequence of job changes allowing 
workers to move closer to their full employment wage. Not all chains are of the same 
length, nor does every chain produce the same welfare gain. This paper presents a 
model of job chains that addresses chain length, welfare gains and distributional 
effects. The application of the model is illustrated using a hypothetical case of a new 
manufacturing firm in the Chicago metropolitan area. The job chains approach to 
estimating multiplier, efficiency and distributional effects associated with the firm, is 
compared with conventional impact analysis estimates. The conclusions discuss the 
implications of these estimates for the evaluation of local economic development 
projects 
   3
1. INTRODUCTION 
The standard approach to dealing with the 'trickle down' of employment 
creation uses surface-level measurement of economic development impacts and traces 
the way they horizontally ripple-through the local economy. This kind of approach 
can be extended to include distributional outcomes in order to answer the question 
‘who gets what?’ as a result of new job creation. However, it still falls a long way 
short in answering questions of economic welfare arising from new employment, i.e. 
‘who gains and who looses from new employment?’ and ‘how much better off are 
they?’. To do this, some measure of opportunity cost is needed that will allow us to 
assess the alternative opportunities forfeited when a worker moves into a new 
position.  In addition, the standard mapping and tracking approach of input-output 
analysis, does not go beyond looking at those who actually get the jobs directly or 
those who feed-off them in secondary and tertiary rounds of employment creation.  
To grapple with these issues, this paper goes one step further and introduces 
the notion of ‘job vacancy chains’. Our approach here is that a ‘surface-level’ 
perspective on employment generation impacts is not sufficient. In order to answer 
questions of welfare and equity we need to understand what is happening ‘sub-
surface’ when new employment is created. This involves adopting a vertical 
perspective on the local labor market, trying to trace-out all the subterranean 
movement set in motion once a new job is created. The job vacancy chain is an 
analytic device that lets us estimate the amount of movement triggered off by a new 
job and to record the traffic in and out of the newly created position until it ceases to 
exists. In the context of evaluating local economic development programs, the 
existence of job chains implies that some share of program gain is likely to be found 
amongst workers who were not the initial focus of the program.  
  A new job will set in motion a chain-like sequence of moves in the local labor 
market. For example, A moves to new job i and vacates job j  for B who moves in, 
thereby vacating job k for C and so on. In this instance, we do not simply observe new 
job i and estimate (horizontally) how many surface-level jobs (indirect and induced) 
are stimulated by this new position. Rather, we take job i as a starting point and 
attempting to measure the vertical or sub-surface implications of this job. The job 
chain will continue until it is broken. This will occur when a worker moves into a new 
job without offering any replacement position, for example an in-migrant to the local 
area, and unemployed worker or someone entering from out of the labor force. It   4
should be noted that the focus of this approach is on the position (vacancy) or the job 
and not the worker.  
  In addition to measuring the number of sub-surface links in a chain, the job 
vacancy chain approach affords two further insights. First, it enables us to observe 
how individuals progress up a chain to higher levels of welfare and to measure the 
welfare that ensues. Existing approaches to measuring surface-level impacts of 
economic development programs seldom include measures of welfare improvement.  
At each completed step up the chain, workers move closer to their fully employed 
status. Workers can make employment and/or wage gains either in jobs newly 
generated by a subsidized program or as a result of vacancies opened by job chains. 
Welfare increments pertaining to the program are not just those directly generated by 
the new job. Rather they are represented by all the increases in welfare in all the 
chains opened up by the new job. Second, the job chains perspective allows us to 
measure the ‘trickle down’ effects of employment creation. While the ‘vacuum effect’ 
of vacating a job in order to move into a new position is often noted (Holt and David 
1966), standard evaluations of economic development programs generally do not look 
beyond those who get the new (directly created) jobs. In this way they ignore the 
genuine ‘trickle-down’ effect preferring to concentrate instead on ‘trickle-across’ or 
‘trickle-within’.  Trickle-down implies positive spillover effects percolating beyond 
the confines of the original stimulus. Our approach suggests that job vacancy chains 
are the vehicle by which this percolation effect takes place. By observing the way in 
which new sub-surface opportunities are stimulated by direct job creation, we can 
posit for example, the effects on the poor, of jobs created for the more prosperous.   
 This paper proceeds in the following manner. The next section reviews the 
adoption of the chains metaphor in a variety of research contexts. We then present a 
model of job vacancy chains that addresses the issues of chain length, welfare gains 
and distributional effects. A hypothetical case of the employment effects of a new 
manufacturing firm in the Chicago metropolitan area is then addressed using the tools 
of conventional impact analysis. These results are contrasted with those derived from 
the application of the job vacancy chains model stressing the role of multiplier, 
efficiency and distributional effects.  Finally, the paper concludes with some 
discussion of the implications of these estimates for the evaluation of local job 
generation programs.   5
2. APPLICATIONS OF THE JOB CHAINS METAPHOR 
 
As the vacancy chain is the building block for understanding many social and 
economic phenomena that involve mobility and inter-dependence, it is not surprising 
that it has been applied in a diverse range of contexts. Some of these contexts, such as 
the housing market (Emmi and Magnusson, 1994, 1995, Hua 1989, Marullo 1985), 
are a ‘natural’ testing ground for this type of analysis. In this section we review three 
other areas of application with direct bearing on our interest in job chains: labor 
market studies, economic development studies and organizational studies. 
At the heart of the chain model is the observation that a move by an individual 
will always simultaneously affect all other parts of the system. While Harrison 
White’s seminal book is often credited with introducing the notion of chain-reactions 
in diverse social systems (White 1970), the roots of the idea can be traced to early 
descriptive studies in the housing market literature (Firestone 1951; Kristof 1965). 
These spawned the housing market ‘filtering’ literature that collected case study 
evidence from a variety of settings and tried to draw urban planning and policy 
conclusions as to efficient allocation of housing for the disadvantaged. 
  The vacancy model has been used in other diverse social science settings as an 
instrument for analysing how supply and demand conditions are matched and how a 
constant process of re-alignment between the two, takes effect. Aside from matching 
dwellings and house buyers, the vacancy model has been used for matching a pool of 
college football coaches with a pool of teams (Smith and Abbot 1983), a pool of 
clergy with a pool of parishes (White 1970a), a pool of musicians and a pool of 
orchestras (Abbot and Hrycak 1990) and even a pool of hermit crabs with a pool of 
shells (Chase, Weissburg and DeWitt 1988).  
  In all this literature much effort is expended in measuring and predicting chain 
lengths. The linear mathematics of Markov processes and Leontief multipliers provide 
ready-made tools for these analyses. Most of these studies however are rather devoid 
of any behavioural model to supplement the mechanics of chain formation. In the 
absence of a model of individual preferences for housing, the statistical regularities of 
chain lengths and housing moves remain rather sterile. Three areas of application are 
most pertinent to our model of job chains. 
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  The first relates to labor market studies. Ostensibly, studies of labor market 
dynamics provide some of the work closest in spirit to the model of job chains 
presented below. Starting with the much-cited work of Holt and David (1966), labor 
economists have used vacancies, job searching and matching functions in order to 
understand the vacancy-unemployment relationship in imperfect markets. This early 
work also stressed the demand-side dynamics of the labor market rather than 
emphasizing supply side characteristics. In this work, vacancies and unemployment 
are the stock variables, regulated by the flow variables such as new hires, recalls into 
the labor market etc. and eventually the market reaches an equilibrium state. 
  Building on this approach, the ‘job flows’ literature further develops the 
vacancy-unemployment model showing how job quits are procyclical and how 
vacancy chains are created in tight labor markets. The existence of vacancy chains is 
also central to understanding the procyclical behavior of quits (Akerlof, Rose and 
Yellen 1988).  Vacancy chains are shorter when unemployment is high as the 
probability of terminating the chain is high with so many job seekers available, who 
offer no job replacement. As opportunities expand, quits will increase and therefore 
quit behavior is procyclical. 
  ‘Job flows’ studies of labor market dynamics stress that in imperfect labor 
markets, flows are often an important  source of adjustment (Blanchard and Diamond 
1992, Burgess 1994, Schettkat 1996a). Flows reflect high levels of mobility that are 
not captured in measures of net change. This labor turnover or ‘churning’ suggests 
that there are sub-surface movements that are not captured by indices of net 
employment change. An obvious source of this discrepancy is the existence of job 
chains. For the case of Germany, it has been estimated that 50 percent of employment 
mobility in periods of tight labor markets is due to this movement along job chains 
(the ‘churning’ effect) and that this figure drops to less than 10 percent in periods of  
slack labor markets (Schettkat 1996b). A variant application of job chains has been 
presented by Gorter and Schettkat (1999). They demonstrate how that unemployed 
job seekers crowd out employed job seekers. Again, the job chain is a central 
mechanism in this process. When the number of unemployed job-seekers filling 
vacancies rises, the implication is that job chains become shorter as these workers 
leave behind no replacement position and consequently opportunities for employed 
job-seekers are diminished.   7
  For our purposes, the upshot of the above is that job chains are often 
acknowledged as important mechanisms in understanding labor market dynamics. 
However, much of this interest does not progress beyond measuring chain length. The 
obvious next step would be to examine the welfare and distributional implications of 
chain effects, but in the current state of the literature, this issue is left unaddressed. 
  The second are is that of organizational studies. Sociologists and 
organizational scientists’ have used the vacancy chain model to study intra-
organizational mobility (see Stewman 1975a, 1986). The focus of these studies is on 
occupational advancement and the type of organizations that promote or hinder this. 
Thus Stewman (1986) uses extensive development of Markov chains in order show 
that the probability of advancement within organizations is higher at intermediate 
levels than at lower levels. Harrison (1988) shows on the basis of U.S. data how the 
vacancy chain model can predict movement between different occupations nationally. 
Both these studies illustrate how the linear mobility model developed by White (1970) 
can be extended to organizational mobility applications.  
  One of the main uses of vacancy models in this literature has been to show 
remarkable similarities in the social organization of different mobility systems. Using 
vacancy chains to trace career paths, Stewman (1975b, 1986)  has shown how similar 
career patterns develop in very different organizations. While much of this work is 
concerned with developing the mathematical and graphic frameworks for calculating 
the probability of advancement within the chain, the results show these mobility 
probabilities are relatively stable and do not decrease as much as expected as the 
individual moves up the career ladder. In fact mid level career positions often had 
greater mobility possibilities than did lower levels, suggesting segmentation in intra-
organizational labor markets. Mobility considerations aside, this field of study, like 
the study of labor markets, has not conceptually or empirically expanded the chain 
model beyond the standard chain length and multiplier calculations. 
  Finally, the area of local economic development studies is the field of interest 
closest to the focus of emphasis in this study and ironically the area in which 
applications of the job chains model are least developed.  The state of the art in 
applying the job chain notion to economic development issues, is particularly 
pedestrian. The sporadic studies that have appeared are mainly concerned with 
surveying and charting of chains. Two early papers looking at vacancy chains in the   8
context of local economic development efforts relate to ‘job shifting’ resulting from a 
program of employment creation in Alberta, Canada (Webster 1979)  a similar 
process resulting from expansion of coal mines in the Hunter Valley New South 
Wales, Australia (Garner et.al. 1981). In both cases, extensive empirical charting 
leads no further than estimates of chain length.  
  More recently, the chain model has been utilized to evaluate the impacts of 
urban development corporations in three United Kingdom cities (Robson, Bradford 
and Deas 1999). Again, a non-probabilistic (mapping) method is employed in order to 
estimate chain length for commercial property vacancies and the role of the 
development corporations in encouraging economic regeneration in the cities. This 
study found particularly short local chains and uses this finding to buttress the case for 
local targeting. 
  The common feature of the above studies is that while they all make some 
attempt at measuring chain length, they all stop short of estimating welfare impacts 
and distributional (trickle down) effects. In order for public policy to make a 
difference, jobs have to be created for local workers who would not have employment 
opportunities in the alternative situation. The benefits of an employment program 
have to trickle down to those local residents most in need. To avoid a purely 
mechanistic perspective of employment on local labor markets we therefore need a 
model of job chains and the welfare gains arising from them. The remainder of this 
chapter presents a simple, linear model of local labor market dynamics under 
conditions of less than full employment. The welfare effects of job chains and their 
measurement is at the centre of this approach.  
 
3. A GENERAL MODEL OF JOB VACANCY CHAINS  
  To move from intuitions to serious empirical work, we need to 
construct a formal model of job chains. We now consider the simplest possible job 
chain model, one in which all jobs can be ranked along a single dimension. Consider a 
local economy in which each job grouping can be represented by a rung along a single 
well-defined job ladder. A job vacancy is resolved in one of three ways: 
•  An employee occupying a job on the rung immediately below the 
vacancy moves up.   9
•  An individual not currently employed along the ladder obtains the job in 
question. Such individuals might be drawn from the locally unemployed, 
those not currently in the labour force, or in-migrants to the community.  
•  The job disappears. The probabilities of these three outcomes (p1,  p2 , p3) 
sum to 1.0 and are fixed for the system. 
  In this setting, a newly created job opens a vacancy at the corresponding rung 
of the job ladder. Whatever its position in the ladder, it will be filled either by 
someone in the immediately lower rung (1, above) or by someone not currently 
employed in the local economy (2, above). The rigidity of the given probabilities 
necessitates a well defined hiring multiplier, m, the expected number of local job 
vacancies created and filled as the result of the appearance of a new job on any rung 
on the job ladder. 
  To see this, consider the probability that a new job will give rise to at least one 
more vacancy that is subsequently filled. This probability is just given by the 
probability that the new job was filled by someone on the ladder, [p1/(1- p3)], times 
the probability that the job vacancy opened in this move was not destroyed, (1- p3). 
This product is simply p1. Now clearly the probability that this filled vacancy will 
give rise to another must also be p1, and so forth down the line. The expected number 
of filled vacancies generated by the new job will be:  
  m = 1 + p1  + (p1)
2  + (p1)
3  + …  =  1/(1- p1)   
Interestingly, the length of the chain depends only on p1. This is true even though we 
count those moving onto the ladder in the same manner as those already on it. To 
appreciate this point, consider two sets of probabilities. Both have the same value for 
p1, but in the first, vacancies can only be filled from the job ladder otherwise they 
disappear. This means p2 = 0 and p3 = 1- p1. In the second, jobs never disappear (p3 = 
0), but they may be filled from off the ladder (p2 = 1- p1). For either set of 
probabilities the new job is filled. Now, under the first case this must mean a vacancy 
is created. That vacancy in turn has a probability  p1 of not disappearing and being 
filled; and so on down the chain. For the second case, we again start with a filled 
vacancy, but now there is a probability, p2 = 1- p1, that it is filled from off the chain   10
and produces no second vacancy. This means that the likelihood of a filled second 
vacancy is just p1 again; and so on down the chain.  
  To use this multiplier to estimate welfare effects, we must assign an expected 
welfare gain to each worker who fills a vacancy. A worker moving up the ladder 
forgoes his or her present wage ￿, in order to obtain a higher wage w at the next rung 
up. From the individual’s perspective the lower wage is the opportunity cost of the 
higher wage. His or her welfare gain is just the difference between the two wages. For 
simplicity, assume the ratio d ( = ￿/w < 1) remains independent of the rung in 
question and incorporates any non-monetary differences in working conditions. In this 
context, filling a single vacancy from the rung below increases welfare by (1- d) w, 
where w is the wage of the vacancy being filled. 
  But what of the welfare gains achieved by those who move into a vacancy 
from outside the labor force, from unemployment, or through migration? These are 
complex transitions; their welfare values have been long debated. For the present 
exercise, we keep matters simple and conservative by assuming that these transitions 
render the same welfare gain as a move up the ladder, i.e. (1- d) w. This assumption 
sets the opportunity cost of individuals moving onto the job ladder at an amount equal 
to the wage of the job just below the one they take. Such a proposition can be 
plausibly defended for both in-migrants and entrants to the labor force, but very likely 
underestimates the gains of those moving out of involuntary unemployment.  
  Now the calculation is straightforward:  
V = (1- d)w[1 + d p1  + (dp1)
2  + (dp1)
3  + … ] =  [(1- d) /(1- d p1)]w            
where V represents the total expected welfare gain set off by the creation of a 
job paying a wage of w. This result has two interesting and interrelated implications. 
Under the assumptions of the simplest job chain model, a new job in a community 
will yield an expected welfare gain less than its wage, since (1- d) < (1- d p1). But 
under those same assumptions, a new job will generate a gain larger than that enjoyed 
by the worker who actually fills it, since the probability of vacancies being filled from 
existing jobholders is taken greater than zero (i.e. p1 > 0). 
  This simple observation relates directly to the ‘all or nothing’ dilemma in 
evaluating wage and employment gains from local economic development programs 
(Felsenstein and Persky 1999). On the one hand, impact analyses meticulously count   11
all new wages arising from job creation as a local gain. In contrast, welfare 
economists, claim that converting job counts into incomes represents ‘a great deal of 
effort that could have been better spent asking different questions’ (Courant 1994, p. 
863). Many workers in subsidised jobs could have invariably found alternative 
employment. Their welfare gain is not represented by their wage but by a much 
smaller amount, i.e. the difference between the new wage and the workers reservation 
wage. This is usually taken as reflecting the opportunity cost of the new job and 
empirical estimates of this cost fluctuate greatly (Jones 1989, Heywood and White 
1990).  
  We can push our simple model a bit further to explore the sensitivity of 
expected welfare gains, V/w, to the key parameters, p1 and d . Figure 1 holds the latter 
constant, but allows the former to vary. Here we have set d at 0.8. The intercept on the 
vertical axis varies directly with 1-d. If no hiring is done from existing local 
employees, p1 = 0, the only expected welfare gain is 0.2 times w. The welfare fraction 
rises slowly as p1 increases away from zero, but then more quickly as  p1 approaches 
1.0.  Keep in mind that  p1 is just equal to 1- ( p2 + p3). Thus if we fix one of these 
probabilities, Figure 1 can tell us how the welfare ratio varies with the other. Of 
course, as the other probability rises we read the figure from right to left and not from 
left to right. 
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  Empirical estimates of  V/w  are presented below .  These are contingent on 
establishing values for the  p and d parameters. At this juncture however we make a 
few educated guesses to at least narrow the likely range. In this spirit, we set p2 at 
about .3, perhaps divided more or less equally between in-migrants and local residents 
not employed in the recent past. In average times, p3 is likely to be considerably 
smaller, say .05. This leaves us with an estimate of .65 for p1. To allow a range for the 
crudeness of the estimate, we take p1 to lie between .6 and .7.  
  These parameters imply that on average a job chain will have a length of about 
three filled vacancies so m=3. On each link we assume that the worker (whether an 
in-migrant, unemployed, out of the labour force or previously employed) has a 
reservation wage (d) equal to 80-90% of his or her new wage. Putting these estimates 
of d and p1 into our basic equation suggests that the welfare gain associated with an 
average new job will be between 20% and 40% of the new job’s wage. 
  These figures reflect a considerable discount on wage gains calculated from 
simple impact models. Yet they also suggest that gains from economic development 
projects can be substantial. The simple model used here also provides a framework for 
handling differences across metropolitan areas in their unemployment rates and in-
migration rates. However, the model cannot address the very real possibility that 
different new jobs generate different benefit ratios. Since our central question is the 
effectiveness of trickle down in the labour market, this deficiency must be corrected.  
 
4. THE MECHANICS OF JOB CHAINS: A LEONTIEF APPROACH 
   
  To operationalize the above and account for job chains of different lengths, 
welfare impacts and trickle-down effects, we present a Leontief-type model of chains. 
As noted earlier, the program-driven approach adopted here stresses the demand side 
impulses for economic development and ‘trickle-down’ is itself as demand-oriented 
concept.  As a demand-driven construct, the Leontief model is particularly suitable for 
examining job chains. Our approach however, differs from the standard input-output 
approach used for estimating change in production chains, in a two respects. First, 
while the conventional Leontief input-output model implies the existence of 
production chains, these are never explicitly calculated. Rather, the standard input-  13
output approach is to infer inter-sectoral transactions from the origin-destination 
matrix and not to delve beneath the surface in search of production chains.  Second, 
our chains model introduces a probabilistic element to estimating chain length that 
does not exist in Leontief models of production chains. 
 
Chain Length:  Our Leontief approach starts with the recognition that 
recruitment may look very different across the rungs of the job ladder. Some job 
vacancies will be filled only with workers already holding very narrowly defined 
skills/jobs, while others may draw on a wider range of candidates. If we can 
categorize all jobs into meaningful groupings on the basis of skill requirements, 
remuneration and conditions of work, then we can think of a new job vacancy as 
setting off a ‘multiplier’ effect as successive workers move from one job to another. 
  The inter-rung probabilities can be represented as a square (origin-destination) 
matrix (Q) with elements, qij, which show the chance that a job vacancy of a j-type 
position is taken by a worker currently in an i-type position. Notice that the sum of 
these elements over i for a given j will be less than one. The difference will be made 
up largely by workers drawn from unemployment, out of the labor force, and in-
migration. Finally, some vacancies will simply result in job destruction or 
disappearance. These terminating events play a role similar to primary inputs and 
imports in an input-output matrix. They act as leakages that dissipate the flow of 
demand in the local area.  
  We have strong theoretical reasons for modeling Q as a triangular matrix. In 
general, workers will not voluntarily move from a better job to a worse one. Of course 
many such moves do take place, but presumably they are involuntary. In the context 
of a chain begun by an economic development project, such involuntary moves 
effectively guarantee that job vacancies always move ‘down’ the job ranking. For 
example, consider the consequences of a project-created semi-skilled (type 2) job 
being taken by a worker who was fired from a high skilled (type 1) job. The type 1 
vacancy would occur whether or not the economic development project takes place. It 
is not part of the chain generated by the project. However, this high skilled worker 
would presumably have been able to take a job at the semi-skilled level even in the 
absence of the development project. The counter-factual is not that the high skilled 
vacancy would not have been created, but that a semi-skilled vacancy would have   14
been taken by this worker. In this sense vacancies can only move ‘down’ and never 
‘up’ the job ranking.  
  The Q matrix allows us to approximate the net consequences of job creation at 
each job level. A simple Leontief-type inversion of the locally based origin-
destination matrix (I-Q)
-1, will yield a multiplier-type matrix of mij’s which show the 
gross number of local i-type vacancies generated by a j type vacancy. Summing down 
the columns of this matrix gives us the total number of links or vacancies per chain, 
triggered-off by jobs of different types. Thus Mj =Simij gives the total number of 
expected vacancies associated with a newly created j-type job including that initial 
vacancy. It seems natural to call Mj the length of a type j chain. A rough approach to 
estimating chain length has been presented above for the simple model. Here as there, 
the key to measuring the length of chains is estimating the probabilities of a chain 
being truncated by an in-migrant, unemployed worker or new entrant. But, since all of 
these can differ depending on the initial ‘new job’s’ level, expected chain length will 
also vary across levels.  
  Because Q is taken to be triangular, the chain lengths, Mj , are relatively easy 
to calculate in a recursive manner. In particular, if we rank skill levels from 1 as the 
highest to n as the lowest, then:  
  Mn = 1/(1- qnn),   
  Mn-1 = [1/(1- q(n-1)(n-1))]  [ 1 + qn(n-1) Mn ],   
  Mn-2 = [1/(1- q(n-2)(n-2))  ( 1 +  q(n-1)(n-2) Mn-1  + q(n(n-2) Mn ),              
  …. 
 
  Welfare Impacts:  Having sketched the theory of chain lengths, we turn to an 
analysis of differences in the expected increments in local welfare arising from the 
creation of different new jobs. Again we emphasize the importance of opportunity 
costs in evaluating welfare gains. In particular for each type of vacancy, i, the welfare 
gain is equal to Sk qkj(wi-wk ), where (wi-wk) represents the difference in wages 
between the new job i and the old job k.  Notice we assume here that those changing 
jobs within the same occupational group, i, will experience no gain (or perhaps, only a   15
negligible one), i.e. wi-wi=0. For in-migrants, unemployed or entrants who might take 
a vacancy at level i we assume that their opportunity cost is just equal to the wage of 
the group at the next lowest level, i+1. Again we take wages at each level to be a 
constant fraction, d, of the wages at the next highest level. Putting these elements 
together then suggests an overall expected gain of adding a j- type job (Vj) is given 
by: 
  Vj = Simij [(Skqki (wi-wk ) + (1-Skqki )(wi- wi+1)]. 
            = wj Simij d
i-j  [(Skqki (1- d
k-i  ) + (1-Skqki )(1-d)].       
  Finally we can use the chains matrix to make calculations concerning the 
distribution of gains across various groups of workers. In particular we might ask for 
any given chain, how much welfare gain goes to the lowest group of workers—those 
who would take the worst group-n jobs if they were available. Given the assumptions 
used in the above equation this Rawlesian welfare measure, Rj, can be easily 
calculated for each j. The result is given in equation (4.5). 
  Rj  = wn mnj (1-qnn )(1-d)       
The only term on the right hand side of this equation to vary with j is mnj. Hence, this 
measure of the distributional consequences generated by a new type j-job depends 
only on the number of vacancies of the lowest level that ‘end’ the job chain.  
 
5. THE LIMITS TO EXISTING APPROACHES : AN EXAMPLE 
In order to appreciate the limits of impact analysis, we present a hypothetical 
example that illustrates the current state of the art. In this example, we envisage a new 
production plant in the industrial instruments sector moving into the Chicago 
metropolitan area. Assuming that the city government is interested in an evaluation 
outlining the local economic impact of the plant, what is the maximum that could be 
expected given the current state of practice in this field? 
A prerequisite for any impact analysis is an accurate account of the 
employment impact of the plant. The 100 direct jobs that the plant creates need to be 
adjusted to account for demand displacement, deadweight employment that would 
have been created in the absence of the plant and local jobs taken by outsiders   16
(commuters or other ‘in-migrants’). Only after this downward adjustment, can direct 
jobs be expanded by a suitable multiplier, to account for the indirect and induced jobs.   
In our example, the 100 direct jobs reduce to 62 (Table 1). The magnitude of 
this adjustment is estimated using parameters generated by the REMI econometric 
model calibrated for Cook County, IL and from actual Census-derived proportions for 
the geographic area under consideration. Export-base theory posits that new non-basic 
employment will compete with existing local employment serving local demand. 
These displaced local jobs are estimated using REMI-generated export shares for the 
instruments industry. Local endogenous employment growth (i.e. deadweight 
employment) also has to be subtracted. This is calculated using a modified shift-share 
approach in which the local share of regional employment growth that would have 
occurred even in the absence of the plant, is considered as employment that cannot be 
credited to the new program. Finally, suburban commuters who take some of the new 
jobs also have to be discounted. Their shares are based on actual census-derived data 
on commuting patterns. To complete the jobs account, the 62 direct new resident jobs 
are expanded to 97 using the relevant industry-based REMI employment multiplier. 
 
Table 1: Hypothetical Example: Benefits and Costs of Chicago Instrument Plant 
EMPLOYMENT  DIRECT  TOTAL 
Projected Jobs:  100  – 
Minus:  Displaced Local Jobs 
  Endogenous Growth 
  Suburban Commuters 
   
New Resident Jobs  62  97 
OVERALL ECONOMIC IMPACT  DIRECT  TOTAL 
Earnings ($Th, 1992)  7,362  11,453 
Costs ($Th, 1992)  2,500  2,500 
BENEFIT MEASURES     
Cost/Job ($Th, 1992)  40  26 
Cost/Earnings  0.34  0.22 
 
 
The next stage is to convert direct and total employment into earnings using 
REMI-generated data. This is based on the average earnings in the instruments sectors 
and those secondary and tertiary rounds of activity stimulated by the direct   17
employment. We arbitrarily assume that project costs are $2.5 million. Two summary 
‘benefit’ measures can then be calculated: cost per job and a cost:earnings ratio. Both 
are measures of project efficiency. The former measures program output and the latter 
program yield. As noted earlier, these ‘benefits’ are really measuring gross impacts of 
the project rather than its social worth or value. 
In most instances, this type of account would represent the maximum extent of 
impact analysis. At best, some effort will be expended in trying to create an accurate 
employment picture. This means considering demand displacement, ‘deadweight’ 
employment and indirect and induced jobs. In many instances, an attempt will further 
be made to translate program-attributable jobs into an earnings estimate. It should be 
noted however, that vary rarely are these earnings ever discounted to account for the 
different opportunities foregone by workers who take project generated jobs, rather 
than alternatives (i.e. opportunity costs). Nor are distributional issues ever considered. 
While great pains are taken to accurately account for all new jobs and income, very 
rarely is the question posed as to how much better off different lower income groups 
really are given all this new employment and income. 
A cursory, first-cut attempt at observing distribution effects within an impact 
analysis framework can be easily accomplished using census-derived proportions. In 
this way, all direct and indirect employment are distributed across five income classes 
in accordance with real-world proportions derived from the census. Table 2 goes 
beyond standard impact analysis practice and presents direct and total employment 
distributed across five income classes according to census-derived proportions for the 
instruments sector in the Chicago area. On the employment side, we can see that once 
total employment is considered (and not just direct employment)  the share of 
employment going to the poorest group (income class 5) rises slightly. However the 
share of employment going to the most wealthy (income class 1) also increases 
slightly so overall the distribution has hardly become more progressive.    18
Table 2: Hypothetical Example:  
Distribution of Employment and Earnings by Income Groups 
 
    INCOME GROUP 
  1  2  3  4  5  SUM 
Distribution of EMPLOYMENT             
Absolute               
  Direct  2  5  21  29  5  62 
  Total  5  8  31  40  13  97 
Share (%)               
  Direct  3.4  8.1  33.3  47.3  7.9  100 
  Total  4.7  8.6  31.7  41.7  13.2  100 
Distribution of EARNINGS 
($Th, 1992) 
           
Absolute               
  Direct  699  1,129  2,891  2,466  177  7362 
  Total  1,519  1,842  4,266  3,367  460  11453 
Share (%)               
  Direct  9.5  15.3  39.3  33.5  2.4  100 
  Total  13.3  16.1  37.3  29.4  4.0  100 
 
The distribution of earning shows a similar, and even more accentuated, 
pattern. Earning are distributed across the five income classes using to census-derived 
proportions for the instruments sector in the Chicago area. While there does seems to 
be a slight distributional shift in favor of the lowest earners when total earnings are 
considered (from 2.4% to 4.0%), this is more than offset by a rise in the share of 
earnings going to the highest earners (from 9.5% to 13.3%). 
While the impact analysis above represents state of the art, its limitations are 
all too obvious. First, it has only treated the question of the counter-factual situation in 
a very partial manner. We have simply (and mechanically) distributed estimated 
employment and earnings across different income classes without asking whether 
some of this income would have been attained even in the absence of the instrument 
plant. Presumably, many of the higher income workers could have attained a similar 
level of earnings in alternative employment. Consequently, they have a high 
opportunity cost which should be discounted from the earnings calculation. As 
illustrated here, standard impact analysis routinely credits all workers with all new 
earnings, irrespective of their alternative employment possibilities. This is a major 
source of over-estimation and probably accounts for the distributional patterns of 
employment and earnings as described above. As a rule, impact analyses do not 
discount the opportunity costs of different income classes from any calculation of new 
earnings or income. Second, these impact analysis results do not allow us to say 
anything substantial about changes in welfare and distribution. The results in Table 2   19
do not give us any idea as to the welfare gains to Chicago workers as a result of the 
new instruments plant, i.e. how much improvement over their current situation can be 
credited to the new plant. Finally, despite the attempt to distribute earnings across 
income classes, these impact analysis results provide very little insight as to 
distributional effects. Are income or employment gains to the poorest greater than to 
all other income classes ? Is there a process of leveling-up going on whereby the 
poorer groups do proportionately better from the new project than the wealthier 
groups? These are issues that economic development evaluation would like to be able 
to answer. Current practice however, falls short of fulfilling these aspirations. 
 
6:  THE JOB VACANCY CHAINS APPROACH 
6.1 The Empirical Strategy 
Great difficulty exists in tracing actual job chains.  In housing market studies, 
a moving household’s residence of origin is well defined and the new occupants of 
that housing unit can be ascertained in a relatively straight forward manner.  But in 
the case of job chains, the definition of a job changer’s origin position is more 
difficult and to determine the new worker now holding that position often impossible.   
Under the circumstances the possibility of using actual chains as the 
underlying data source for empirical work on U.S. job chains seems slight.  But this 
does not imply that we can make no progress in estimating the coefficients of an 
origin-destination matrix.  Even where direct chain data are lacking, we can adopt a 
synthetic approach, not unlike that used in input-output analysis.  After all, input-
output researchers do not trace back through actual market transactions at every stage 
of production for a given good.  They do not actually log the sale of the cloth to the 
apparel firm, then the sale of the cotton to the textile firm, the sale of petroleum to the 
farmer and so on.  Instead, they estimate an average “input vector” for each industry, 
assume that vector to remain constant whatever the use of the industry’s product, and 
then infer the necessary character of production chains.   
To use such a synthetic approach for job chains we need to define and measure 
the equivalent of the IO input vector. If we break jobs down into discreet groups 
based on wages or some other general measure of quality, we simply ask what 
proportion of vacancies in a job at level 1 are filled by workers employed in level 2 
jobs, workers employed in level 3 jobs, etc.  To fill in the elements of such a vector   20
we need information only on a sample of job changers-their new jobs and their old 
jobs.  Still following the IO model, we now assume that the probability of a given link 
in a job chain (e.g. the probability that the vacancy opened at level 3 is filled by a 
worker employed in level 5) depends only on the level of the vacancy being filled 
(e.g. level 3), and not on any other characteristics of the chain (e.g. the chain began 
with a new job at level 1).  With this key assumption we need no further information 
concerning job chains.  In effect, once we are armed with these “input vectors,” we 
can synthesize the distribution of job chains.        
This approach to job chains greatly simplifies the empirical requirements of 
the theory.  To construct “input vectors” for a given job level, we only need 
information on job changers.  We do not need observations on entire chains, but only 
a representative sample of unrelated chain links.  Such data are available from 
workers’ longitudinal job histories.  Without ever creating a sample of real job chains, 
we can now estimate all the relevant coefficients of the “input vectors” including 
those that make up the origin-destination matrix (Q). 
Our primary data source is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 
the Survey Research Center in the Institute for Social Research at the University of 
Michigan, which contains detailed information on a broad sample of households, 
including many job changers. It should be noted that first, detailed job data from the 
PSID are only available for household heads and their spouses.  While basic 
employment status and earnings are reported for other household members, these data 
are not sufficient to determine job changes.  As a result our sample consists only of 
changes by heads of households and spouses of heads.    Second, the PSID data set 
does not provide a continuous job history even for heads and spouses.  Rather it 
reports detailed data concerning length of tenure for the primary job position, if any, 
held at the time of the annual interview.  Thus we know when a head or spouse took 
his/her present job, but not what other jobs they may have been hired into and 
separated from since the last interview.  These data miss those multiple job changes 
that occur within a year.  Hence estimates of the overall frequency of job changes 
from PSID data have a second source of underestimation.     
Third, a positive feature of the PSID data set is that it allows us to define both 
job changes and position changes, where the first denotes a change of employers and 
the second a change of activities within the same business.  In principle, this means 
we can consider intra-firm mobility as well as inter-firm mobility as workers move   21
along job chains. For the national PSID sample, about 600 individuals (heads and 
spouses) a year take new positions, with sufficient documentation to be included in 
this study.  Of these half are starting with a new employer.  To increase the sample 
size in our basic analysis, we include all job takers in the most recent six years for 
which full data are available, 1987-1993.    The resulting data can be interpreted as 
relating to a representative region of the country.   
 
6.2 Estimating the Augmented Q Matrix  
In practice then, we assign every reported job, whether it’s just being taken or 
just being left behind, to one of five a real-wage groups.  The highest of these runs 
from $25.50 to $40 per hour in 1992 prices, group two is then $16.40 to 25.50, group 
three $10.50 to $16.40, group four, $6.70 to $10.50 and group five $4.25 to $6.70.   
While somewhat arbitrary, each group’s lower bound is approximately two-thirds of 
its upper bound.   
Using these definitions we can estimate the probability that a group j vacancy 
is filled by a worker currently employed in a group i job, i.e. the qij ‘s above.    Taking 
the sample period, 1987-1993, we simply calculate the ratio of workers who made the 
i -> j move to the total number of workers who took j group jobs.  As in a Leontief 
input matrix, every column in the resulting Q matrix adds up to less than one.  The 
residual in each column indicates the probability that jobs of that group are filled 
outside of a vacancy chain.     
The residual probability for a wage group can be disaggregated into the 
probabilities of filling vacancies from each of our three residual categories: 
unemployed, out of the labor force, and in-migrants.  While differentiating among 
these categories is not crucial to determining chain lengths or the multiplier effect, 
such differentiation becomes crucial in estimating welfare and distribution effects.  
We look to the PSID data source for this information, i.e. what proportion of jobs 
taken at any given job level draw on each of the residual categories.  The PSID 
includes data on the month an individual took his or her present job as well as 
monthly data on whether that individual was employed, unemployed or out of the 
labor force.  In addition it records both the state of residence of a household in each 
year and whether it lives in a metropolitan area.  We define in-migrants as those who 
change their state of residence between two years and/or change from a non-
metropolitan county to a metropolitan one.   22
Before turning to our results one further point should be made.  In the real 
world, not all job moves increase an individual’s wage level.  For wage groups 2-5, a 
fraction of all vacancies is filled by workers stepping down the wage hierarchy.  In 
our data this fraction rises from about 4% for group 2 to 10.6% for group 5.  These 
downward movers create a problem in interpretation.  It is difficult to conclude that 
such job changers are actually worse off for the presence of a vacancy at the level 
they ultimately find work.  Presumably, in the absence of the vacancy they actually 
take, such downwardly mobile workers would have found a job at about the same low 
level, or perhaps lower.  But such a downward move is essentially exogenous to a job 
chain initiated by a new (net) job. 
Under the circumstances it seems fitting to reallocate these downward movers 
among all other movers in some manner.  This stratagem can be interpreted in either 
of two ways.  One possibility, is to think of the downward mover as “sinking” to some 
other job (or one of the residual categories) and then “moving up” to the vacancy they 
actually take.  Alternatively, the downward mover might be considered as taking the 
new vacancy at the level he/she actually settles, but in so doing opening another 
equivalent vacancy at that level that otherwise they would have filled.   Thus in the 
empirical work that follows downward movers are allocated proportionally to all 
other categories.  In effect, this adjustment triangularizes the Q matrix which simply 
amounts to the mathematical expression of the proposition that new vacancies do not 
cause downward job movements.      
  
 Table 3 presents our basic estimates for the Q matrix relating to the entire 
period 1987-1993.  Each column in the table shows the “input vector” for the 
corresponding job group after adjustments for triangularization.  An element in a 
column gives the proportion of the column vacancies filled from that origin row.  
Every column must sum to 100%.     23
 
Table 3:Basic Origin Destination Matrix 
 
 
      New Wage Group   
Origin  1  2  3  4  5 
Wage Group 1  41.1%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Wage Group 2  25.0%  52.9%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Wage Group 3  4.8%  22.1%  46.6%  0.0%  0.0% 
Wage Group 4  2.2%  1.5%  18.5%  47.3%  0.0% 
Wage Group 5  0.0%  0.3%  2.4%  13.3%  34.5% 
Unemployed                           2.9%  3.8%  9.7%  15.8%  24.7% 
Out of Labor Force                   4.0%  3.8%  7.5%  13.5%  30.5% 
In-Migrant                                20.1%  15.6%  15.4%  10.0%  10.2% 
Column Sum  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0%  100.0% 
    
Starting with job vacancies in the highest wage group, as reported in column 
1, the element in the top row tells us that 41% of vacancies at this level are taken by 
individuals who already have a job in the same group.  About 25% of the vacancies 
go to workers employed in the second wage group and switching up to higher paid 
jobs in the first group.  As we might well expect, workers holding jobs in groups 3, 4 
take few vacancies in the top group and workers in group 5 take virtually none.  The 
unemployed and those out of the labor force are also relatively unimportant recruiting 
fields for these high end jobs.  However, a large share of group 1 vacancies, about 
20%, go to in-migrants.       
The data in the matrix suggest several generalizations.  First, job changes 
within a wage group, the diagonal elements of the matrix, are somewhat more 
common for groups 2,3 and 4 than for the highest group.  But group 5 vacancies are 
less likely to go to those already employed in the group.  Second, upward job 
movement remains largely limited to workers leaving their current job to fill a 
vacancy in the immediately higher group.  Third, the importance of recruiting from 
the unemployed and the out of the labor force groups falls steadily as wage level rises.  
Finally, the share of vacancies filled by in-migrants rises steadily with rising wage 
levels. 
 
6.3 Chain Lengths  
These observations are of considerable interest.  A first, but incomplete, 
summary of the matrix can be gleaned from calculating the basic Leontief multipliers   24
as defined above.  Recall that these multipliers provide direct estimates of the chain 
lengths associated with a new job.  Given the substantial dependence of low wage job 
recruitment on non-employed workers, it is not surprising that the multiplier for the 
lowest category comes out at only 1.5.  Still, this implies that, on average, a net 
expansion of a hundred jobs at this level gives rise to another fifty opening at the 
same level.  150 individuals, not 100, will fill vacancies.  The chains generated, in this 
case, are particularly simple.  We expect about two-thirds, say 65, of the new jobs to 
be immediately filled by the non-employed and hence to create no chain effects.   The 
other third of the new jobs, about 35, go to workers already employed in group 5 jobs, 
thus opening 35 additional vacancies at this level.  Again about two-thirds of these 
vacancies draw on the non-employed.  One third on the employed.  The probability of 
a chain consisting of just two vacancies is then 1/3*2/3 = 2/9, i.e. about 23 of the 
initial chains will have exactly two vacancies.  In the same manner, we can calculate 
that 2/27 of the chains (or about 7 out the initial hundred) will have three vacancies, 
2/81 will have four, and so on.  Taking the full range of possibilities then, we know 
that the average chain length will just be our multiplier of 1.5.  Ideally this predicted 
distribution of chain lengths and its mean would be empirically tested against an 
actual distribution taken from a sample of chains.  But as noted above, generating data 
on full chains remains highly problematic. 
Expected chain length for the lowest wage jobs are short.  Calculating 
Leontief multipliers for each of the other wage groups shows a rise in expected length 
with skill/wage level.  The longest chains, with an average of 3.5 links, are found in 
the top two wage groups.  These results answer one of our key questions.  Yes,  in-
migrants are more likely to fill high-wage vacancies and the unemployed are more 
likely to fill low wage vacancies.  But on net, the chains for high wage jobs are 
considerably longer than those for low wage jobs.  With about 80% of all vacancies 
filled by employed workers, these high end jobs generate more second round 
vacancies.  And since these induced vacancies are mostly at high wage levels, they in 
turn generate quite a few third round vacancies.          
To explore the nature of these chains further, we can disaggregate the chain 
multipliers to show for each type of chain the expected number of vacancies 
generated at each level.  As discussed earlier, this disaggregation is just the equivalent 
for our chain system of the (I-Q)
-1 matrix from standard input-output theory.  The 
results for our basic matrix are presented in Table 4.  The ‘All Groups’ row at the   25
bottom of the matrix gives the set of chain-length multipliers we have just been 
discussing.  The column above each of these entries shows a disaggregation of the 
generated vacancies by wage group.  For example, reading down column 1 we find 
that on average a new job in wage group 1 generates 1.7 vacancies in its own wage 
group, 0.9 vacancies in group 2, 0.5 in group 3 and so on.  The column adds to the 
vacancy multiplier of 3.5.                  
  
 




      Initial New Job   
Wage Groups  1  2  3  4  5 
Wage Group 1  1.70  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Wage Group 2  0.90  2.12  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Wage Group 3  0.52  0.88  1.87  0.00  0.00 
Wage Group 4  0.28  0.37  0.66  1.90  0.00 
Wage Group 5  0.08  0.12  0.20  0.39  1.53 
           
All Groups   3.48  3.48  2.73  2.28  1.53 
 
         Perhaps, the most interesting observation to be made from this 
disaggregation, concerns the extent to which high level chains reach down to open 
vacancies in low level wage groups.  A new job in the highest wage group generates 
.36 vacancies in the two lowest wage groups.  This connection is not so much a direct 
one.  As noted above, only 2% of group 1 vacancies are filled by workers currently 
holding group 4 or group 5 jobs.  Rather, the vacancies generated at these lower jobs 
come toward the end of typical job chains.  If in the first round a vacancy is opened 
up in group 2, then in the next round a vacancy might open in group 3.  A group 3 
vacancy, unlike a group 1 vacancy, has a real possibility of being filled by a worker in 
group 4 or group 5.  Indeed, from Table 4 we can read this probability as about 20%.  
While not all chains initiated in group 1 will reach these later rounds, those, which do, 
will contribute to building vacancies at the lower end of the job hierarchy.    
  A new job in groups 1 opens .36 vacancies in group 4 and 5 toghether.  
Similarly, from the second column of Table 5-2, we find that a new group 2 job is 
expected to generate almost .5 vacancies in groups 4 and 5 together.  These levels of 
impact on low wage job vacancies create at least the possibility of significant benefit   26
trickle down.  However, we cannot really evaluate such trickle down benefits, until 
we have used our job chains as a basis for measuring welfare gains. 
 
6.4 Individual Welfare Gains    
Job Changers: Given the definition of our wage groups, it is not difficult to 
determine the average gains of upwardly mobile job changers.  From the PSID we can 
estimate wage levels for both the original job and the new job.  The average gains for 
each origin-destination pair are given in Table 5.  Since we are primarily interested in 
what portion of a new wage represents a welfare improvement, these figures are 
calculated as a percentage of the wage at the new destination job, not the original job.  
In general these gains are quite impressive.  As might be expected, workers moving 
up one step in the job hierarchy gain less than the average difference between those 
two steps, i.e. they are either earning above average in their old job, or below average 
in their new job or both.   This one step gain comes in at about 23% of their new 
wage, where the average difference between levels is about 37%.  For two or three 
step movers the difference between actual change and average difference becomes a 
good deal narrower, 54% as compared to 58%.  Throughout, we use the percentage 
changes from our sample. 
 
Table 5: Average Wage Gains by Job Changers 
    Destination Wage Group 
Origin Wage Groups  1  2  3  4 
Wage Group 1         
Wage Group 2  24.1%       
Wage Group 3  54.0%  21.2%     
Wage Group 4  73.6%  55.7%  23.3%   
Wage Group 5  -  66.8%  53.3%  24.1% 
Note: All changes as a percentage of the destination wage, not the original wage.  
 
Clearly upward job changes generate significant improvements in welfare.  
These are relatively easy for us to estimate.  Much more difficult to determine are the 
welfare gains for job takers who were previously unemployed, out of the labor force, 
or lived elsewhere.  At root, any estimate of the welfare gains of these groups requires 
an evaluation of the alternative opportunities available to such workers.  The gain is   27
the difference between the wages taken and what was given up.  As suggested above, 
these alternatives, or opportunity costs, are notoriously difficult to estimate.    
The Unemployed: We start by considering workers obtaining jobs from 
unemployment.  The key question here hinges on the degree to which such 
unemployment is voluntary.  In a world with imperfect knowledge, unemployed 
workers and job vacancies may exist side by side.  As search theory tells us, both 
workers and employers may make gains from improving their information.  These 
gains from search represent a real opportunity cost when an unemployed worker takes 
a job.  Put somewhat differently, a voluntarily unemployed worker “knows” that 
he/she can obtain a reasonable position either in this labor market or somewhere else.  
For such a worker, the opportunity cost can be reasonably associated with the 
reservation wage that worker seeks from a new job.  That reservation wage is likely to 
be a substantial fraction of the actual wage this worker finally commands.   
But of course, not all unemployment is voluntary. Where does voluntary 
unemployment stop and involuntary unemployment begin?   We adopt a simple 
approach to this problem.  We take as the cutoff point between voluntary and 
involuntary unemployment, a rate of 2.5%.  This rate presumably covers the type of 
job searching in a labor market characterized by less than perfect information.  Such a 
figure of this has often been mentioned in connection with frictional unemployment.  
Moreover, it comes very close to the actual unemployment rates we measure for 
college graduates in our sample in a tight labor market year, 1989. In good times these 
workers can obtain solid jobs relatively easily.  Hence, if they report themselves to be 
unemployed at such times, we can expect that they are voluntarily unemployed.   
In principle, then, an unemployment rate in excess of 2.5% indicates the 
presence of involuntary unemployment.  But how can we determine unemployment 
rates for each of our wage groups? By definition, once a worker has a job in a specific 
wage group, he or she is employed. Our approach to this dilemma rests on estimating 
an unemployment rate based not on actual wages received, but rather on expected 
wages.  We first estimate a wage equation of the type common in the human capital 
literature.  This equation regresses the logarithm of the hourly wage on sex, age, age 
squared, and a set of educational dummy variables.    The regression is for all PSID 
heads and spouses employed in 1992. This equation allows us to then calculate a 
predicted wage for both the unemployed and employed workers in the PSID data set.  
On the basis of these predicted wages, it is straightforward to assign all labor force   28
participants to a wage group and calculate an unemployment rate for each of these 
groups.   Since 1992 was the bottom of the recession, we go on to repeat the 
calculation of unemployment rates (using the same wage equation) for the boom year 
of 1989.  
For individuals with predicted wages in our two highest wage groups our 
average estimated unemployment rate comes out at about 2.25%. By assumption, 
then, a worker moving from unemployment to a job in wage group 1 or group 2, is 
voluntarily unemployed.  The resulting effective rates are 5%, 8.5%, and 19.5%% for 
groups 3, 4 and 5, respectively. Presumably, then, all the unemployed in a group over 
2.5% are involuntarily unemployed, i.e. 2.5% of group 3, 6% of group 4, and 17% of 
group 5.   
These somewhat speculative calculations give us a way to divide the 
unemployed into voluntary and involuntary.  But what is the opportunity cost to place 
on each of these.  The most extreme assumption would be to claim the involuntarily 
unemployed face no opportunity cost to taking a job, while the voluntarily 
unemployed face an opportunity cost equal to just about 100% of their ultimate wage.  
A more reasonable approach recognizes that even the involuntarily unemployed gain 
some welfare from their time, and the voluntarily unemployed generally set their 
reservation wage below the wage they actually obtain.  Rather than setting the 
opportunity cost of the involuntary unemployed at 0%, we place it at 25%.  For the 
voluntary unemployed we place the opportunity cost at 75%.  The main point here is 
not the specific numbers chosen, but maintaining a significant difference between 
them.   
The final piece in this rather involved train of logic, is to assume that the 
unemployed hired into a job of a given wage class are drawn randomly from the 
unemployed population with a predicted wage at that group’s level. In effective this 
makes the opportunity cost for such a new worker a weighted average of the 
opportunity costs of the voluntarily and involuntarily unemployed, the weights being 
the shares of that group’s unemployment pool in each unemployment category, i.e. 
OCi = (ui - .035) * OCinvoluntary + .035 * OCvoluntary ,   
where OC refers to opportunity cost, i is the wage group, and ui is the 
unemployment rate of that wage group.   
  The resulting opportunity costs given by this approach seem plausible.  
The highest two groups have values of 75%, group 3  is 50%, group 4 is 40%, and   29
group 5 is 31%.  These opportunity costs play the same role for those drawn from 
unemployment that original wages play for job changers.  Hence, an individual 
coming from unemployment to a group 1 or group 2 wage should be credited with a 
welfare gain of 25% of that group 1 wage.  Coming into a group 3 job, a worker gains 
about 50% of the new wage, in a group 4 job 60%, and in a group 5 job 69%.  Thus 
for those originating in unemployment, this last set of figures provides the equivalent 
to a row in Table 5 for those originating in a particular wage group. 
 
Out of the Labor Force: Perhaps the trickiest opportunity costs to determine 
are those for workers drawn from outside the labor force. Rather than compare those 
who enter employment from the out of the labor force category to that category as 
whole, it seems more reasonable to compare them to unemployed workers with the 
same general skills.  In tight labor markets, where most unemployment remains 
voluntary, those entering the labor force will have similar opportunities to the 
voluntarily unemployed.  On the other hand, in markets where involuntary 
unemployment is high, new entrants are likely to face fewer opportunities and more 
immediate pressures.   From this perspective, the appropriate opportunity cost for 
labor force entrants will be quite similar to that for the unemployed.   This is the 
approach we take in all our empirical work.  Hence, using our estimates for the 
unemployed, we set a high opportunity cost, 75%, for the top skill/wage groups and a 
relatively low opportunity cost, 31%, for the lowest wage group.   
In-migrants: In-migrants, both from elsewhere in the country and from abroad, 
are generally in a position to scan across geographic areas searching for their best 
opportunities.  Very likely in-migrants face roughly similar opportunities in a number 
of alternative places. This logic applies most strongly to high wage/high skilled 
workers, but it is likely to extend to low-wage workers as well.  For simplicity we use 
the same opportunity cost for them as for the unemployed in the same wage group. 
The simplifying assumptions used to construct the opportunity cost estimates for the 
unemployed, out of the labor force, and in-migrants involve considerable speculation.  
Under the circumstances it seems useful to perform a sensitivity analysis, 
supplementing these “best estimates” with a range of alternatives.   
      30
6.5  Welfare Gains Along Average Chains      
We are now in a position to put together the various pieces and estimate the 
welfare gains associated with job chains.  The key to this exercise is simply to weigh 
each of the expected moves in a chain with the welfare gain associated with that 
move.  This involves using an equation, that allows for different opportunity costs 
applied to each of the residual categories.  More specifically we calculate the 
following equation for each wage group, j = 1, 5.                
 
Vj / wj = Simij  (wi / wj )[(S kqki gki  + qui (1- ocui)  + qni  (1- ocni) + qmi  (1- ocmi)]   
 
where Vj stands for the expected welfare gain from a chan launched by new 
job in the jth group, wj is the average wage in the jth group, mij is the disaggregated 
vacancy multiplier that tells how many openings at the ith level are generated from a 
new opening at the jth level, qki is an entry in our basic origin-destination matrix (Q), 
gki refers to the percentage wage gain in moving from job type k to job type i (from 
Table 4), and oc stands for opportunity cost, with u, n, and m subscripts representing 
unemployed, out of the labor force and in-migrant.      
Notice that the above equation represents the welfare gain of initiating a j-
chain as a percentage of the average j-wage.  This seems a good summary measure 
since so many impact studies simply add up expected wages.  In this context, (Vj / wj) 
can be viewed as a discount or mark-up factor to be applied to wages from new j-
group jobs.   
Carrying out the calculations (Table 6, Row 1), we find that all the V/w figures 
are substantially less than 100%, implying that the multiplier effects of the job chains 
are more than offset by the opportunity costs associated with employed workers and 
others filling vacancies.  Given the relative magnitudes of the multipliers and the 
opportunity costs reported above, this result is not surprising.         
The real story lies in the range of values of V/w across the five wage groups.  
For chains starting with a new job in any one of the top two wage groups the total 
welfare gain to all affected workers runs about 40% of the direct wage of the initial 
job.  But this ratio is not constant across all wage groups.  Rather it rises sharply as we 
move to the lower wage groups facing the burden of higher unemployment rates.  The 
ratio is 56% for group 3, a bit over 60% for group 4 and almost 70% for group 5   31
(Table 6, Row 1).   Hence, what we labeled the efficiency effect in Chapter 4, favors 
low wage job creation over high wage job creation.  If subsidy costs for generating a 
dollar of wages remain roughly constant across wage groups, it will be more efficient 
to choose projects in which the wage bill is more heavily concentrated at the lower 
end of the job hierarchy.    
 
Table 6: Efficiency and Distributional Effects 
 
   
Wage Group of Initial New 
Job 
   
  1  2  3  4  5 
V/w  0.43  0.42  0.56  0.62  0.69 
           
Share to Job Changers  0.52  0.37  0.21  0.10  0.00 
Per  initial new job:           
Dollars per year to Lowest  ( R ) $397  $550  $960  $1,888  $7,202 
Dollars per year to Low   $4,654$4,303  $6,600  $10,582  $7,202 
    
In addition to the basic results for V/w, Table 6 includes answers to several of 
the empirical questions we raised earlier in this chapter.  Dropping the terms in the 
above equation  which involve movement from unemployment, out of the labor force, 
or outside the region allows us to calculate the share of welfare gains achieved by job 
changers participating in job chains. These shares reported in Row 2 fall steadily from  
52% in the highest wage group to zero in the lowest.  Welfare gains at the high end 
are much more likely to go to the already employed.  Welfare gains at the low end go 
to those without work.   
Row 3 in the table presents the Rawlesian measure of distributional impact.  
Here we calculate the share of all gains going to those taking vacancies in group 5.  
The pattern is quite striking.   Creating jobs at the top of the job hierarchy does 
relatively little for those at the very bottom.  The chains may be long at the top, but 
they are still cut off before creating vacancies at the bottom.  Even if we take a wider 
measure of those in need, including all those workers either coming from the two 
lowest groups or taking jobs in the two lowest groups, we still find that adding jobs in 
the two lowest groups has the strongest distributional impact.  Trickle down just is not 
very strong.   32
 
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis 
The results presented so far underscore the potential usefulness of a job chains 
approach.  If robust, these estimates could add significantly to our ability to evaluate 
economic development activities.  But are these figures highly sensitive to the 
assumptions that have peppered our empirical methodology?  We can address this 
question most directly by altering key assumptions and observing the results.   
   
Table 7: Sensitivity Analysis of Efficiency Results (Vi/wi) 
 
 
Wage Group of Initial 
New Job 
Alternative Opportunity Cost 
Assumptions  1  2  3  4 
Basic Assumptions  .43  0.42  0.56  0.62  0.69 
0.75 for All In-Migrants  .41  0.39  0.47  0.54  0.62 
0.25 for All Unemp & Out of Labor  Force/ 
0.75 for all In-Migrants   .51  0.51  0.57  0.63  0.67 
0.25 for All Non-Job-Changers  .74  0.72  0.74  0.74  0.75 
       
 
Table 7 reports the estimated values of (Vj/wj) under four alternative sets of 
assumptions.   These are:  1) set the opportunity costs as defined in the basic 
assumptions of the study; 2) use a high opportunity cost (75%) for all in-migrants; 3) 
set the opportunity costs for all the unemployed and those out of the labor force at 
0.25, leaving the opportunity cost for in-migrants at 0.75; and 4) set the opportunity 
cost for all non-employed job takers at 0.25.   These exercises suggest that the 
findings under the basic assumptions stand up well to alternative specifications of 
opportunity costs.  Only in the fourth alternative, does the pattern of  the (Vi/wi)’s 
change substantially.  The key change here is the reduced opportunity cost for in-
migrants.  With this lower cost, new jobs in the higher wage groups yield 
considerably more welfare per wage dollar, rising from about 40 cents/dollar in the 
basic run to over 70 cents/dollar in the alternative.  If all in-migrants have low 
opportunity costs, then new high wage jobs that draw heavily on high skilled in-
migrants generate real gains.  But the assumptions necessary to generate this 
conclusion seem unrealistic.  Recognizing the considerable uncertainty that surrounds   33
our estimates of opportunity costs, the sensitivity evidence support the robustness of 
our basic findings. Welfare generated per dollar of wages remains lower for high 
skilled jobs, despite their larger multipliers.   Distributional concerns also favor lower 
skilled jobs over high wage jobs.   
 
6.7 Job Vacancy Chains: Expanding on Impact Analysis   
Returning to the impact assessment presented above  (section 5), we can re-
estimate the gains attributable to that economic development project in light of our 
enriched understanding of how vacancy job chains.  Again these calculations are for a 
hypothetical instruments manufacturing plant in Chicago.  The plant employs 100 
workers.  The left side of Table 8 reproduces our previous results on job multipliers as 
presented in Table 2.  The right side shows the revisions if we use a chain approach to 
calculate job vacancies.   
   
 
 
Using job chains we recognize that many more individuals are influenced by 
the new plant than we first expected.  The jobs in the instrument plant ultimately 
result in 240 vacancies filled by Chicago workers.  This vacancy multiplier includes 
not only the horizontal creation of new jobs through the traditional input-output 
mulitipliers, but also the vertical opening of job chains as each new job, whether 
direct or indirect sets off a string of job moves.  In terms of vacancies we do see a 
Table 8: Distribution of New Jobs and Table 8: Distribution of New Jobs and   
All All Vacancies by Earnings Groups  Vacancies by Earnings Groups   
   
   
New Jobs New Jobs        All Vacancies All Vacancies 
Number  1  2  3  4  5  Sum    1  2  3  4  5  Sum 
Direct  2  5  21  29  5  62    3  12  44  71  24  154 
Total  5  8  31  40  13  97    8  21  67  100  43  240 
                           
Share  1  2  3  4  5      1  2  3  4  5    
Direct  3.4%  8.1%  33.3%   47.3%   7.9%  100%    2.2%  8.0%  28.5%   45.8%   15.4%   100% 
Total  4.7%  8.6%  31.7%   41.7%   13.2%   100%    3.5%  8.9%  28.0%   41.7%   17.9%   100%   34
trickle down effect as the lowest earnings group enjoys the greatest overall ratio of 
total vacancies to direct new jobs, 43/5.   
The lowest group which accounted for only 8% of direct new jobs, ultimately 
offers 18% of total vacancies.  The next to the lowest job group shows a  more muted 
pace of expansion, from 29 direct jobs to 100 total vacancies, roughly in line with the 
results for more skilled jobs.      
While these vacancy effects are of interest, what we really want to know are 
the welfare implications of the job chains created by the project.  Taking both the 
horizontal and the vertical multiplier processes into account we estimate that overall 
welfare benefits generated by the new instrument plant are about equal to $5.3 
million, down from the initial estimate of total earnings gain of $11.6 million. While 
chains imply that more workers are affected by a project, this abundance of vacancies 
cannot offset the explicit accounting of opportunity costs.   
Using job chains we can explore distributional issues identifying individuals 
on the basis of what jobs they ultimately hold.  Thus we ask what proportion of 
welfare gains accrue to workers who ex-post occupy jobs in the various earnings 
classes.  Table 9 gives our results using the job vacancy estimates.  In section 5 
(above) we found that 6% of total earnings (including horizontal multiplier effects) 
went to workers holding new jobs in the lowest earnings group.   Here we see that the 
welfare gain achieved by all workers filling vacancies (as opposed to those taking 
only newly created jobs) in this earnings class amounts to about 7.5% of estimated 
overall welfare gains.  Group 4’s share rises even more, from 30% to 34%.  Group 3 
is the only other group to have a higher share of welfare gains than of earnings, and 
not by much at that.  All groups show absolute welfare gains are less than our simple 







Summarizing the above results for the hypothetical instruments manufacturing 
plant considered here and expanding an impact evaluation model to include job 
vacancy chain effects suggests the following:  
•  more people than first estimated are positively affected by the 
economic development project.  
•  overall benefits are substantially lower than “new earnings.” 
•  trickle down  increases the proportion of benefits going to those 
starting in the two lowest earnings groups.    
While local employment generation an issue high on the public policy agenda. 
considerable uncertainty still surrounds the evaluation of welfare benefits from local 
job creation and retention. Cities and states have engaged in expensive programs of 
subsidizing business with only a very imperfect understanding of the social value of 
those programs.  When evaluation has been done at all, it has most often taken the 
form of simple impact analysis-an adding up of new payrolls and taxes.  But even 
assuming the new jobs can be traced to the public subsidies involved, standard impact 
assessments can hardly answer the most telling criticisms of local economic 
   
   
   
Table 9: Distributio Table 9: Distribution of New Earnings and Welfare Gains  n of New Earnings and Welfare Gains    
Across Ex Across Ex- -Post Earnings Groups Post Earnings Groups   
   
   
   
Earnings Earnings       Welfare Gains Welfare Gains    
Number  1  2  3  4  5  Sum    1  2  3  4  5  Sum 
Direct     $674  $1,021 $2,741 $2,516 $268  $7,218   $287  $430  $1,532 $1,566 $184  $3,999 
Total       $1,684 $1,633 $4,075 $3,470 $697  $11,558   $718  $688  $2,279 $2,160 $478  $6,322 
                                 
Share  1  2  3  4  5       1  2  3  4  5    
Direct     9.3%  14.1%  38.0%  34.8%  3.7%  100%   7.2%  10.8%  38.3%  39.2%  4.6%  100% 
Total       14.6%  14.1%  35.3%  30.0%  6.0%  100%   11.4%  10.9%  36.0%  34.2%  7.6%  100% 
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development efforts, that they bring jobs to those who don’t need them: to high 
skilled workers who already hold jobs and to those who have little claim on the local 
community: in-migrants from elsewhere in the country.   
The job vacancy chains model presented above has attempted to deal with 
these issues and at the same time avoid the pitfalls of too mechanistic a perspective on 
labor market dynamics. In much of the social science literature using the chains 
metaphor, a pool of workers and a pool of jobs exist and the issue is simply one of 
matching. No attention is given to markets, prices do not change and the vacancy 
model simply gives an account of the rippling-through effect that occurs sub-surface 
with the creation of new jobs. On the other hand, market models of this process where 
a price structure emerges and the market clears, can give a sterile perspective on what 
is essentially the dynamic process in which all of us make our career paths. 
 The job chains model presented here looks as welfare gains from chains at 
different skill levels and incorporates insights from opportunity cost theory. We have 
attempted to show that prices alone do not control the supply and demand for jobs and 
have credited workers with more autonomy. Their decisions to in-migrate, re-enter the 
labour market or retire, affect the labour supply. Similarly, by assuming under-
employment and a fairly rigid wage structure, we note that demand impacts on chains 
and on the welfare that accrues from chains set-off by different skill levels. Echoing 
Bartik’s ‘hysteresis’ theory of local job growth (Bartik 1991), we note that both 
supply and demand shocks affect chain length and welfare impacts. In this view of 
labour market processes, short run dynamics such as movement through a job chain, 
have long-term effects. Once a chain is triggered-off and workers start to move up to a 
new platform. They accumulate new levels of human capital, skills and work habits 
that serve them in any further progressions along the job chain. Even if the external 
agent of change (the job chain), was removed, they would not return to their initial 
state. Local employment creation, via the chain process, can therefore lead to long-run 
changes beyond the initial (short-term) effect of the job creation itself. 
A important implication of the above is the inter-relatedness inherent in 
employment creation. Chains limit our ability to use targeting as an economic 
development strategy. The job chains model shows us that targeting one group in the 
population will always affect other sub-groups, as they are all inter-connected via job 
chains. At the very least targeting economic development efforts must be undertaken   37
in a more sophisticated context; one that accounts for the ramifications generated 
through labor vacancy chains. 
   38
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